We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest. This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: 1 What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? Section 1 of this paper will deal with the first of these questions.
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The internal—external distinction is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an ontology into two parts: an internal part consisting of a linguistic framework and observations related to that framework, and an external part concerning practical questions about the utility of that framework. However, recently a number of authors have come to the support of some or another version of Carnap's approach.
Carnap introduced the idea of a 'linguistic framework' or a 'form of language' that uses a precise specification of the definitions of and the relations between entities. The discussion of a proposition within a framework can take on a logical or an empirical that is, factual aspect. The logical aspect concerns whether the proposition respects the definitions and rules set up in the framework.
The empirical aspect concerns the application of the framework in some or another practical situation. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic. The utility of a linguistic framework constitutes issues that Carnap calls 'external' or 'pragmatic'.
The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities. The distinction between 'internal' and 'external' arguments is not as obvious as it might appear. A more formal statement of the internal-external difference is provided by Myhill:.
Quine disputed Carnap's position from several points of view. His most famous criticism of Carnap was Two dogmas of empiricism , but this work is not directed at the internal-external distinction but at the analytic-synthetic distinction brought up by Carnap in his work on logic: Meaning and Necessity.
Quine's approach to the internal-external division was to cast internal questions as subclass questions and external questions as category questions. What Quine meant by 'subclass' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's? On the other hand, 'category' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's? Quine argued that there is always possible an overarching language that encompasses both types of question and the distinction between the two types is artificial.
It is evident that the question whether there are numbers will be a category question only with respect to languages which appropriate a separate style of variables for the exclusive purpose of referring to numbers.
If our language refers to numbers through variables that also take classes other than numbers as values, then the question whether there are numbers becomes a subclass question Even the question whether there are classes, or whether there are physical objects becomes a subclass question if our language uses a single style of variables to range over both sorts of entities.
Whether the statement that there are physical objects and the statement that there are black swans should be put on the same side of the dichotomy, or on opposite sides, comes to depend upon the rather trivial consideration of whether we use one style of variables or two for physical objects and classes.
So we can switch back and forth from internal to external questions just by a shift of vocabulary. As Thomasson puts it,  if our language refers to 'things' we can ask of all the things there are, are any of them numbers ; while if our language includes only 'numbers', we can ask only narrower questions like whether any numbers are prime numbers. In other words, Quine's position is that "Carnap's main objection to metaphysics rests on an unsupported premise, namely the assumption that there is some sort of principled plurality in language which blocks Quine's move to homogenize the existential quantifier.
My nose is only part of an object, my person. On the other hand, is my nose the same as the collection of atoms or molecules forming it? This arbitrariness of language is called conceptual relativity, a matter of conventions. Thus, in this view, the Carnapian multiplicity of possible linguistic frameworks proposes a variety of 'realities' and the prospect of choosing between them, a form of what is called ontological pluralism , or multiple realities.
A related idea is quantifier variance. Then 'quantifier variance' combines the notion that the same object can have different names, so the quantifier may refer to the same thing even though different names are employed by it, and the notion that quantifier expressions can be formed in a variety of ways.
Hirsch says this arbitrariness over what 'exists' is a quandary only due to Putnam's formulation, and it is resolved by turning things upside down and saying things that exist can have different names. In other words, Hirsch agrees with Quine that there is an overarching language that we can adapt to different situations. More recently, some philosophers have stressed that the real issue is not one of language as such, but the difference between questions asked using a linguistic framework and those asked somehow before the adoption of a linguistic framework, the difference between questions about the construction and rules of a framework, and questions about the decision whether to use a framework.
Ryle's functional orientation attention — his attention to the question as to what a linguistic category does — will instead lead us to focus on the difference between the functions of talk of beliefs and talk of tables; on the issue of what the two kinds of talk are for , rather than that of what they are about.
But the poor mathematician translates it into equations, and as the symbols do not mean anything to him he has no guide but precise mathematical rigor and care in the argument. The physicist, who knows more or less how the answer is going to come out, can sort of guess part way, and so go along rather rapidly.
The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics. But one should not criticize the mathematicians on this score They are doing their own job. One approach to selecting a framework is based upon an examination of the conceptual relations between entities in a framework, which entities are more 'fundamental'. One framework may then 'include' another because the entities in one framework apparently can be derived from or 'supervene' upon those in the more fundamental one.
Instead, we should go back to Aristotle and look upon nature as hierarchical, and pursue philosophical diagnostics : that is, examination of criteria for what is fundamental and what relations exist between all entities and these fundamental ones. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article contains too many or overly lengthy quotations for an encyclopedic entry. Please help improve the article by presenting facts as a neutrally worded summary with appropriate citations.
Consider transferring direct quotations to Wikiquote. July Quine: "On Carnap's Views on Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Philosophical Studies. II 5 : 65— Reprinted in W.
Quine The ways of paradox: and other essays 2nd ed. Harvard University Press. Word and Object. University of Chicago Press. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. But it can be freed of this association Bird Reprinted in: Graham H. In Thomas Bonk ed. Quine, On Carnap's Views on Ontology".
The Journal of Symbolic Logic. Quoted by Oswaldo Chateaubriand, Quine and Ontology. See this on-line version. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago University Press. Ontology after Carnap. Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. The many faces of realism 2nd ed. Open Court Publishing. Representation and Reality.
MIT Press. A different aspect is epistemological pluralism. See E. Brian Davies I take it for granted that the world and the things in it exist for the most part in complete independence of our knowledge or language.
Our linguistic choices do not determine what exists, but determine what we are to mean by the words "what exists" and related words. The concept of mind 2nd ed. It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'colored' or 'sexed'.
They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising'. See Rescorla, Michael Jan 13, Edward N. Zalta ed. Retrieved The prehistory of the theory of distributions. Feynman The Character of Physical Law Penguin reprint ed. Penguin Books Limited. For example, Newton's laws of motion suffice for practical engineering work like building and bridge design, even though the more 'fundamental' theory of the Standard model of elementary particle physics is available.
The more 'fundamental' model is, for such engineering, superfluous. In Robert Barnard; Neil Manson eds. The Continuum companion to metaphysics.
Carnap, Semantics and Ontology
Rudolf Carnap — was one of the best-known philosophers of the twentieth century. Notorious as one of the founders, and perhaps the leading philosophical representative, of the movement known as logical positivism or logical empiricism, he was one of the originators of the new field of philosophy of science and later a leading contributor to semantics and inductive logic. Though his views underwent significant changes at various points, he continued to reaffirm the basic tenets of logical empiricism, and is still identified with it. Beginning in the s, a reassessment set in that has resulted in a much more nuanced and complex picture of his philosophy and its development.
Nice post. Keep updating Artificial Intelligence Online Training. Pages Home List of posts About. Below are some notes on the first two sections Carnap's classic paper ' Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology '. Carnap's ideas in this paper have been very influential, and there has been a recent flurry of interest in them, as reflected in the publication of a volume entitled Ontology After Carnap.